Nonconforming Driver

"We didn't see that it was appropriate or feasible to renege on what we had told the golfing public," he argues. "I don't view that as defensive at all. I view that as taking the most aggressive stance we thought was feasible."

Closely on the heels of the COR decision, Driver and the USGA were confronted with the evolution of the ball. In the late 1990s several manufacturers approached the USGA and said they would soon have the capability to make a single ball that combined the best characteristics of balata balls and distance "rocks." If the new ball was ever marketed, it had the potential to provide balata players with 16 to 18 yards in distance and to grant "rock" devotees much greater playability. Regardless of the ball that eventually emerged, manufacturers and the USGA would have to be mindful of the Overall Distance Standard (ODS) for golf balls established in the mid-1970s. The "rocks" of 1998 were already extremely close to the ODS limit. The softer balata balls were well short of the limit.

"The only option was to change the ODS and move it back to where soft balls were," said Driver. "The effect would have made 74 percent of all balls previously approved nonconforming. None of the hard-ball manufacturers knew how to make a soft ball, and the soft-ball manufacturers had patents on it. So based on this prediction of a new ball, but not proven fact, are you going to outlaw 70-odd percent of all the balls being played--which tend to be the balls played by the average golfer because they're less expensive and more durable--and are you then going to favor the manufacturer who has patents on the soft, shorter ball by doing that, which would have likely created chaos in the golf world and a lot of antitrust and legal issues in order to protect against something that might happen?"

Adds Driver, "It was the most complex issue and series of challenges I've ever faced in my career." This from a man who, while at King & Spalding, argued and won the largest bank fraud case in U.S. history. The USGA's thinking on COR and balls and their subsequent actions on a range of issues have left many pointing to a change in the culture of the USGA. Terms like identity crisis are tossed around (says one former staffer, "The USGA wants to be the center, but they don't want to have to decide the hard issues"). Staff morale, typically high in bucolic Far Hills, is said to have plummeted. In an almost unheard-of act of open revolt, one long-time employee recently sent a vituperative e-mail to committee chairmen roundly criticizing the executive committee's recent decision to cut benefits. The e-mail, obtained by Golf World, reads in part, "I can assure you the staff got a clear message from this executive committee about how much they value our efforts."

Traditionalists from outside Far Hills have been sharing their dissatisfaction with the direction of the USGA for years. In 2005 former PGA Tour commissioner Deane Beman sent a letter to Fred Ridley, Driver's predecessor, questioning the willingness of the USGA to stand up for the game. Jack Nicklaus, blaming distance for the increasing irrelevance of thousands of quality golf courses, has been advocating a rollback of the ball for years. Under Hootie Johnson, Augusta National seriously considered designating a shorter ball for Masters use. Geoff Shackelford, author, course architect and avowed traditionalist, is among those who closely track the USGA. He says the association's apparent lack of will on distance is causing the USGA to lose ground not only with staffers and the game's insiders, but with its very bread and butter: golfers.

"They're irrelevant with the manufacturers, they're irrelevant, or getting there, with the tours and they're irrelevant to the good player at the elite clubs in the United States," says Shackelford. "They've lost the last people they'd hoped would be on their side."

One eye-opening example of the USGA's tenuous position can be found in the recent spate of non-conforming drivers that have inadvertently found their way to the market. Nike, Callaway, Cobra and Cleveland offered to replace the offending models with conforming ones, but, says one equipment exec, "The feedback we're getting from retailers is a lot of people have said they actually want to buy one. ... That, to me, is frightening."

Concerns about the association's identity have been exacerbated by actions taken by Driver and/or the executive committee on other issues, actions seen by many as less than central, or even contradictory, to the USGA's mission. Among recent examples:

Micromanagement: One of the most stultifying trends at Golf House is the diminishing role of staff. The executive committee is supposed to act as a resource for staff, but it's the staff, under the direction of the CEO (in this case, USGA executive director David Fay), which is responsible for generating ideas, presenting them to the board, getting approval and pursuing the work. Today that is decreasingly the case.

"[The sense is] the top 60 or 70 staff people are not sitting at the table anymore," says a former USGA employee. "You have executive committee members summoning specific staff to the table, sending them away and deciding things, and sometimes not even telling them what they've decided or--even discussed." Says one current staffer, "The last two administrations have been very hands-on. Personally, I'd say too much. I think they've gone too far."

One current example of this trend is the case of Cameron Jay Rains. Rains is the co-chairman of the 2008 U.S. Open at Torrey Pines. He is also a member (since 2003) of the executive committee. This circumvents the time-honored practice in which local championship chairs report to USGA staff. When asked whether the arrangement presents a conflict, Driver says, "He was the chair of the '08 Open before he came on the executive committee, and we essentially screened him off from any potential conflict." Pressed to admit Rains' dual interests could at least raise some eyebrows, Driver is dismissive. "Doesn't work that way," he insists.

Some observers aren't so sure. "The person negotiating on behalf of the city of San Diego [Rains] is also on the USGA executive committee," says Shackelford. "He's on both sides of the table. So when San Diego [officials] want to know how many hats were sold and what their cut of the revenue is, this isn't a problem? Who is [Rains] looking out for? It's just astonishing."

Rising expenses: With a nest egg conservatively estimated at $290 million, the USGA is awash in cash. Still, the association has been on a notable spending spree. In 2005 total USGA expenses were $97 million. By 2006 that number had risen to $133 million and had contributed to a rare operating loss estimated at more than $6 million.

When asked what's at the root of the losses, Driver says, "We're spending more money than we're taking in." Pushed to be more specific, Driver explains, "Money is fungible. You can spend money or save money anywhere. All the dollars count the same." Others close to the USGA pinpoint U.S. Open site selection as the culprit. Venues with ample acreage for parking and hospitality generate more revenue than land-starved venues such as Winged Foot, which hosted the 2006 Open.